Despite the wealth of empirical and theoretical studies, the origin and maintenance of cooperation is still an evolutionary riddle. In this context, ecological life-history traits which affect the efficiency of selection may play a role, though these are often ignored. We consider here species such as bacteria, fungi, invertebrates and plants which exhibit resting stages in the form of a quiescent state or a seedbank. When quiescent, individuals are inactive and reproduce upon activation, while under seed bank parents produce offspring remaining dormant for different amount of time. We assume weak frequency-dependent selection modeled using game-theory and the prisoners dilemma (cooperation/defect) as payoff matrix. The cooperators and defectors are allowed to evolve different quiescence or dormancy times. By means of singular perturbation theory we reduce the model to a onedimensional equation resembling the well known replicator equation, where the gain functions are scaled with lumped parameters reflecting the time scale of the resting state of the cooperators and defectors. If both time scales are identical cooperation cannot persist in a homogeneous population. If, however, the time scale of the cooperator is distinctively different from that of the defector, cooperation may become a locally asymptotically stable strategy. Interestingly enough, in the seedbank case the cooperator needs to be faster than the defector, while in the quiescent case the cooperator has to be slower. We use adaptive dynamics to identify situations where cooperation may evolve and form a convergent stable ESS. We conclude by highlighting the relevance fo these results for many non-model species and the maintenance of cooperation in microbial, invertebrate or plant populations.
Introduction
After years of intensive research, the question how evolutionary forces generate and stabilize cooperation is still not fully understood. In a naive setting, cooperation is prone to exploitation of defecting individuals. The defectors have an advantage in e.g. feeding on a public good produced by cooperators, which alone carry the costs for the public good production. Thus, the defectors are able to grow faster than the cooperators, and name meaning (quiescence) meaning (seedbank)
x i active population above ground population y i resting population seed population N = x 1 + x 2 total active pop. total above ground pop. replicator equation -only two new constants appear, that reflect the time scales of the two types. We discuss the circumstances that allow cooperation to persist in this system. This first part focus on the ecological time scale. In the second part, we use adaptive dynamics in order to investigate if evolution promotes cooperation. Here we consider the evolutionary time scale, where rare mutations and selection lead to change the parameters of the system. We find that the strategy to defect is always an evolutionary stable state. This strategy, however, can be convergent unstable, such that a small perturbation is able to start an evolutionary dynamics that increases cooperation in the system. Thereto, the time scale of the resting state has to change with the degree of cooperation. Interestingly enough, seedbanks and quiescence require completely different dependencies: the cooperating, quiescent individuals have to stay longer in the resting state, while cooperator seeds need to germinate earlier than their defector counterparts.
Model
We discuss a model for quiescence and one for seedbanks in parallel, as these as well as the analysis closely resembles each other. Lengthy derivations are deferred to the appendix. In both models we describe the amount of individuals of two different types (or genotypes) interacting in the population. The types are found in an active subpopulation (metabolic active population for quiescence, and above-ground population for seedbanks).
We denote this active subpopulation by x i (i = 1, 2). The quiescent population/seeds are denoted by y i . We aim at a replicator equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) . Therefore we choose our basic model to be linear (all individuals are independent, in particular, no competition). In reproduction, a weak interaction between the two types takes place. That is, the reproduction rate β i of type i is modified by an additive term ωg i (x 1 , x 2 ) that expresses the effect of frequency-dependent selection on type i. As usual for weak selection, ω is small. It is later possible to use ω as a small parameter in a singular perturbation approach and to reduce the dimension of the system. In the quiescence model, the active individuals in the population can reproduce, becomes resting (quiescent), or die. The quiescent individuals become active (wake up) at a certain rate while death also occurs (parameters are found in table 1). The model equations reaḋ
In the seedbank model, only the above-ground population reproduces. The offspring are seeds which can enter the seedbank and remain dormant for some amount of time depending the seed germination rate. The above-ground individuals and the seeds die at specific rates. We havė
We model the frequency-dependent interaction by a payoff-matrix Π of a 2-player, 2 strategy game, as it is often done to address cooperation (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) . We denote by e i the i'th unit vector, and define the payoff of type i,
where this term is only defined if the total active population N = x 1 + x 2 > 0. Later on we use the convention that x 1 denotes the population of cooperators, and x 2 that of defectors.
Basic properties, projection, and neutral model
We have g i (ζ x 1 , ζ x 2 ) = g i (x 1 , x 2 ) if ζ > 0. That is, the model equations are homogeneous of degree one. Asymptotically, they tend to grow exponentially (Müller and Kuttler, 2015) . If ω = 0, the equations for the two types become uncoupled and the models become linear. Standard arguments show that the asymptotic exponentially growth rate λ (for the quiescent model and genotype i) is given by the larger root of the characteristic equation
while the exponent λ (s) i for the seedbank model and genotype i is determined by the larger root of
The exponents are always real as the matrices of the linear models are M-matrices (Berman, 2014) .
In order to further investigate the long term behavior, in particular for ω > 0, we project the equations in defining new coordinates (recall that N = x 1 + x 2 )
Note thatx 1 +x 2 = 1, such that we only need an equation forx 1 ; ifx 2 appears below, it always refers tô
We obtain for the quiescence model
and for the seedbank model
In the following, let always * ∈ {q, s}, depending on the model considered (quiescence/seedbank). As we know that for ω = 0 the subpopulations for types 1 and 2 do not interact and grow exponentially, we find: That is, the (weak) frequency dependent selection only has an influence on the dynamics if λ
2 . In this case, both types grow (for ω = 0) at the same rate. We are inclined to talk about a neutral model in this case. 
Proof: For ω = 0, both subpopulations (x i , y i ) evolve independently, and tend to an exponentially growing population. We consider eqn. (7) resp. (10) to inferŷ i in terms ofx i (where we take into account that d dt ln(N ) isin the exponentially growing solution -just the corresponding exponent). Let us focus on the first subpopulation.
If the initial value is larger zero, we find its limiting behavior characterized by the fraction of active and resting population, given by some variablesx 1 ,y 1 ≥ 0,x 1 +y 1 = 1 and c 1 > 0 such that
The same for population 2. Hence, for t → ∞,
The solution tends in the long run to the line of stationary points.
Weak selection
If ω > 0 but small, the singular perturbation theory (O'Malley, 2012) provides the appropriate framework to discuss the dynamics. We expect a solution to converge O(ω)-close to the line of stationary points on a fast time scale, and consequently to move slowly on an invariant manifold, again O(ω)-close to the line of stationary points. We are in particular after this slow long term behavior. As the long-term dynamics is expected to stay ω-close to the line of invariant points, we introduce new coordinates (x 1 ,ỹ 1 ,ỹ 2 ),
and the abbreviationx 2 = 1 −x 1 .
Proposition 3.1. The neutral quiescence model for ω > 0 reads (defining i = 2 if i = 1 and vice versa)
Proof: Appendix A.1. 
Proof: Appendix B.1.
Note that the models are now in the standard form for singular perturbation theory. We first consider the fast time scale, taking ω → 0. Then,ẋ i = 0, 
where the lumped parameters A ( * ) i read for the quiescence model
while that for the seedbank model are given by
The numerator as well as denominator of (22) To obtain the dynamics on the slow manifold, we plug this quasi-stationary state into the equation ofx 1 , and find the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. The dynamics of the reduced system on the slow manifold in evolutionary time scale T = ω t is given by
Note that we simply obtain a generalized replicator equation, where in contrast to the system without inner time scale, the gain functions g i (x 1 ,x 2 ) are modified by constants A = 0 we are back in the standard case (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998 ). This observation is in line with previous findings indicating that models with seedbanks can be well approximated by models without seedbanking, but with rescaled parameters (Blath et al., 2013 (Blath et al., , 2015 Koopmann et al., 2017; Heinrich et al., 2018) .
Prisoners dilemma and time scales
We first note that the functions g i (x 1 ,x 2 ) are linear. Apart of the stationary statesx 1 = 0 andx 1 = 1, there is at most one more interior stationary state. In case that this interior stationary state does not exist, we find directional selection, and any trajectory tends to a boundary equilibrium. If the interior stationary state is present, either it is unstable (disruptive selection, each boundary equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable), or locally stable (balancing selection, all trajectories in the interior tend to the interior stationary state).
We investigate the prisoners dilemma (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) , given by the payoff matrix
where we assume for now that b > c > 0. Hence,
The generalized replicator equation in that case reads
The sign of the curled bracket determines the stability of the equilibria. We obtain at once the following corollary. this strategy is even globally stable (directional selection). In the other case, 2 ). Only if quiescence resp. seedbanks are present in the system, and the time scale for the resting state is distinctively different for the two types such that the coefficient A for the cooperator is larger than that for the defector, cooperation may become (locally) stable.
The basic assumption in the present theory is the neutrality of the two types. The time scale of the seedbank/quiescence state is in particular determined by γ. If we fix all parameters but α (quiescent model) resp. µ x (seedbank model), the condition that λ ( * ) is fixed and constant superimposes a dependency of γ and α (resp. µ x ): If we vary γ, we are able to determine α = α(γ) (resp. µ x = µ x (γ)), s.t. λ ( * ) stays constant. It is now possible to discuss the dependency of A ( * ) on the time scale of the seedbank/quiescent state, given by γ.
Proposition 3.5. Let γ 0 > 0 and α 0 > 0 (µ x,0 > 0) correspond to a growth rate λ 0 > 0.
Quiescence: α(γ) > 0 is well defined and non-negative for γ > 0.
Seedbank: There is a γ 0 > 0 such that µ x (γ) is well defined and non-negative for γ > γ 0 . A
The proof is given in appendix Appendix A.3 and Appendix B.3. All in all, in order to satisfy A
, and γ 1 < γ 2 for te quiescence model (resp. γ 1 > γ 2 fr the seedbank model). The time scale of the defector (γ 2 ) needs to be faster (resp. slower) than that of the cooperator (γ 1 ).
The fitness of the population is only determined by the active population; in case of the quiescence model, we
while that for the seedbank model reads
In both cases, we find that the fitness is increased if he ratio γ i y i /x i (resting over active population, scaled by the rate to become active or to germinate, respectively) is increased. As γ i y i /x i = A ( * ) i g(x 1 ,x 2 ), this observation explains why large A ( * ) for the cooperators does favor their maintenance. The resting state acts an amplifier for (weak, frequency-dependent) selection effects.
In quiescence, reproduction goes to the active population. In order to increase the ratio of resting and active population (by the weak selection term) the resting population should become slower. In seedbanks, the reproduction directly supplies the below-ground population. In that case, seeds should germinate faster.
Adaptive Dynamics
Until now we mainly focused on the ecological time scale addressing the question of which type (cooperator and defector) out-competes the other in a population. We turn from ecology to evolution by assuming that the resting strategies of cooperators and defectors can now evolve over time. We assume that from time to time rare mutants appear in a population of residents (cooperators or defectors). If the mutants can spread and take over, evolution does a step: The parameters of the resident population changes. That is, while the dynamics of interactions within the population is interesting on the ecological time scale, the change of parameters (traits) themselves can be driven by evolutionary dynamics. The main tool to study such evolutionary change in our (deterministic) setting is Adaptive Dynamics (Geritz et al., 1997; Diekmann, 2004 In our setting, a trait is characterized by the time scale of the quiescent state/seedbank (represented by A ( * ) (γ)), and the degree of cooperativeness, which is described by the generated benefit b. The production of benefits comes with costs for the producing individual, with larger benefits being more costly. The generic cost parameter is defined as c = C(b) for some function C. The natural assumptions are C(0) = 0 (no benefit, no cost), and Under the assumption of trait independence, the evolution of resting state and cooperation would be uncoupled. 
If only the resident is present, then x 1 = 1. We aim to know two different properties of the mutant: (a) Can the mutant invade the resident? (b) Is the mutant able to outcompete the resident, and to take over the system?
, and
Then, the generalized replicator equation readṡ Proof: We have
The function G(x 1 ; b r , b m ), as defined above, is nothing else but G(x 1 ; b r , b m ) = g 1 (x 1 , x 2 )(1+A r )−g 2 (x 1 , x 2 )(1+ A m ), and hence the generalized replicator equation is given byẋ 1 = x 1 (1 − x 1 ) G(x 1 ; b r , b m ). The remaining statements of this proposition are a direct consequence of the linearity of G in x 1 .
Based on this proposition, we can (at least partially) answer our original question. If we assume that the resident has trait b, we find a criterion that mutant with (slightly/infinitesimal) larger b are able to take over.
then Adaptive Dynamics predicts b to increase under the pressure of evolutionary forces.
Proof: We show that the inequality given above implies G(1; b, b + ε) < 0 and G(0; b, b + ε) < 0 for ε > 0, while for ε < 0 the reversed inequalities hold true. Consider the Taylor expansion of G(
where we used the assumption of the proposition in the last inequality. Note that the zero'th and the first order term are independent on x 1 . As G(
, and the derivative is negative, the result follows. Proof: First of all, 
If C ′ (0) > 0, proposition 4.2 shows that the ESS is evolutionary convergent stable. Let us assume that C ′ (0) = 0 and 
proves that the ESS b = 0 is evolutionary unstable.
We exemplify the last theorem. We choose the function A(b), paralleling inequality (27),
Here, we choose ζ > 1, such that A(b) satisfies the strict inequality (27) in case that b − C(b) > 0. We still have the freedom to select C(b); we use two different functions, to exemplify the situations C ′ (0) > 0 resp. C ′ (0) = 0.
Case 1: C(b) = κb, where κ ∈ (0, 1) (most natural case).
The solution of the ODE for A(b) reads
That is, we always have A(0) = −1. Recall that our quiescent/seedbank model do not produce any function The Pairwise Invasion Plots (PIP) for these two cases in the quiescent model are presented in figure 1 . In both cases, these is a convergence stable ESS with cooperation (b > 0).In line with the theorem above, trait b = 0 is a convergent stable ESS in case 1 (C ′ (0) > 0), while it is convergent unstable in case 2 (C ′ (0) = 0). In the latter case, a small initial perturbation leads to an increasing amount of cooperation. While the cooperation is increasing, A(b) is increasing, the time scale of the resting state given by γ decreases. Therefore, the higher the degree of cooperation, the longer becomes the quiescent state and conversely the shorter is the seedbank.
Discussion
We investigate a model for quiescence or seedbanks, augmented by cooperation. We find that the system with weak frequency-dependent selection can be reduced to a generalized replicator equation. Comparing this equation with the classical replicator one, additional constants that express the time scale of the resting states of the respective types are found. Our main results state that in contrast to the classical results, for which cooperation is never (locally asymptotically) stable, the resting stages may lead to a stabilization and maintenance of cooperation in our models. This result is in line with simulation studies indicating that the co-evolution of age and time scales may foster cooperation (Wu et al., 2009; Rong et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2012; Rong et al., 2013) . Ultimately, the cooperating type needs to be slower than the defector in the quiescent model and faster in the seed bank model for this stabilizing effect to occur. Note that this observation is counter intuitive for quiescence, as the red queen assumption (Hauert et al., 2002; Decaestecker et al., 2007) indicates that in general the species with the smallest generation time has an advantage and can out-compete the slower species (as we find in the seed bank model). However, in some cases of host-parasite coevolution, the host may outcompete the parasite despite having longer generation time, an effect termed as the red-king hypothesis (Bergstrom and Lachmann, 2003; Damore and Gore, 2011) . In this scenario, the hosts do set the stage and the possible outcomes and as such can be seen as potential defectors. The parasite, which reproduces several times within a host, is therefore forced to cooperate. Note that in the Red King theory, the parasites live within the hosts and thus hosts' and parasites' roles are not exchangeable. In the present study, the mechanisms that stabilize cooperation seem to be slightly different because cooperators and defectors are symmetric in most of their life-history traits aspects.
It is particularly interesting that the time scales of quiescence and seedbank should vary in opposite directions to promote and maintain cooperation. We explain this result by the difference timing in offspring production and when these offspring are present in the active population and thus under selection. In the quiescent model, all offspring are produced and enter the active population after the parent individual exists the quiescent state.
In the seedbank model, offspring are produced when the parent is in the active population, but they become dormant and the offspring will germinate and enter the active population at different future time points. In other words, the competition between offspring of a given parent is immediate in the quiescent model while it is delayed in the seedbank. As cooperation is favored when its frequency is high enough so that cooperators do out-compete defectors, dormancy should be short for enough cooperators to be present at the same time, while this condition is fulfilled in the quiescence as several offspring directly enter the active population. In order to be maintained, cooperators should evolve compared to defectors 1) longer quiescent times, or 2) shorter dormancy times. In both models the evolution of quiescence or dormancy results in a higher fraction of the population that is resting, amplifying the beneficial effects of weak selection. If the defectors have a smaller resting fraction, their amplification factor is smaller than that of the cooperators, and cooperation can prevail.
Using adaptive dynamics, we also show that in our populations with resting stages, 1) cooperation can appear, and 2) evolution leads to different optimal quiescent or dormancy strategies for cooperators and defectors. It is of interest to discuss the plausibility of these two events to happen and to be observed in natural systems.
We show that cooperation appears spontaneously if the resident trait without any cooperation (b = 0) is, due e.g. to a small perturbation, replaced by a trait with a little cooperation (b > 0 but small) assuming the costs for cooperation being very small (C ′ (0) = 0). The latter prerequisite could seem at first hard to satisfy in any real world system. In fact, some systems would meet these requirements. If bacteria use metabolic prudence (Schuster et al., 2013; Boyle et al., 2015) , they produce the public good at time periods at which other resources are the limiting factor (for growth) than the resources needed for producing the public good. In this case, the public good production does not superimpose a growth rate reduction, and thus the costs for the public good production vanish (or at least are very small). We speculate that this scenario at the initial state would allow the increase of public good production. The degree of cooperation is then expected to grow until a convergent stable ESS is reached. At the ESS, a certain public good production and a certain time scale for the resting stages are observed, and this combination would allow cooperation not only to develop but also to persist. Though, eventually the costs would increase later on and further evolution of the resting stages would occur.
Once cooperation can evolve and be maintained, defectors and cooperators do evolve different optimal quiescent or dormancy strategies. We are not aware of empirical observations or experimental evolution studies supporting our hypothesis. Future studies on bacteria experimental evolution could manipulate the rates of dormancy (Beaumont et al., 2009; Lennon and Jones, 2011) or quiescence by e.g. manipulating the environmental variable such as resources over time or generating artificially seedbanking by freezing samples at regular time intervals.
Such approach could be used in systems where bacteria are already used to study the evolution of cooperation (Schuster et al., 2013; Boyle et al., 2015) . In natural systems, we conjecture that the partners of symbiotic systems such as Angiosperms and Gymnosperms and their mycorhizal fungi (Strullu-Derrien et al., 2018) may be good models to assess the existence of seedbanks and differential dormancy in cooperators or defectors. One would expect, for example, that the more cooperating strains of mycorrhizal fungi would show shorter dormancy times than the more defective strains.
Finally, we highlight that the present approach is based on the assumption that public good production and time scales are strongly intertwined, which may not always be true in all biological systems. Nevertheless, we propose a novel hypothesis for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation in an homogeneous system by the evolution of resting stages (quiescence or seedbanks).
Let i = 2 if i = 1 and vice versa. For symmetry reasons,
With the characteristic equation for λ 
We show that A < 2λ (q) , that is, A/2 < λ (q) .
Proposition Appendix A.1. We have the inequalities 2 λ As λ (q) is the larger root (which we know to be real) of the polynomial, and the squared term has a positive sign, A/2 < λ (q) . Hence A − 2λ (a) < 0.
We use the same approach as above, and inspect p q (.) at β i − α i − µ x,i . p q (β i − α i − µ x,i ) = (β i − α i − µ x,i ) 2 − (β i − α i − µ x,i ) (β i − α i − µ x,i − γ i − µ y,i ) −(β i − α 1 − µ x,i )(γ i + µ y,i ) − α i γ i = −α i γ i < 0.
As above, the inequality is an immediate consequence of p q (β i − α i − µ x,i ) < 0.
In order to show the third inequality, we first note that λ (q) > 0 implies β i − µ x,i > 0: Therefore, we start with the observation that the roots of p q (λ) read
If β i − α 1 − µ x,i + γ i + µ y,i > 0,
and if β i − α 1 − µ x,i + γ i + µ y,i < 0 (and hence β i − α 1 − µ x,i < −γ i − µ y,i ),
In any case, λ − < 0. Hence λ To show λ (q) < β i − µ x,i , we inspect p q (λ) at λ = β i − µ x,i , and find p q (β i − µ x,i ) = α i (β i − µ x,i + µ y,i ) > 0 which implies the desired inequality. 
